The United States (US) District of Columbia District Court, in Washington DC, registered the case 1:24-cv-00278: “ (PacerMonitor, 2024)” on January 30th, 2024. Serious accusations are raised by the Kurdistan Victims Fund (KVF), Maki Revend and other plaintiffs against Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Masoud and Masrour Barzani, other Barzani family members, KRG representatives, two US public officials and other defendants.
This trial is not a first in the US justice system. This article briefly presents aspects of the trial initiated by KVF, Maki Revend et all against defendants as mentioned in the complaint and in published media articles, the preceding trial against Masrour Barzani in the US initiated by Shnyar Anwar Hassan (PacerMonitor VA, 2024), and separately latest developments related to Iraqi Kurdistan geopolitical trajectory, which remains connected to oil and gas wealth of this region.
The two recent cases against Barzanis in the United States
In the case registered by the US District of Columbia District Court at the end of January 2024, the plaintiffs are KVF, Maki Revend and John Does 1-5000 (The New Arab, 2024). According to Michael Rubin (Rubin 1, 2024), KVF is a US non-profit charitable organization established in 2023, funded by net proceeds from court awards/settlement, aiming to help victims of “Kurdish abuses against Kurdish people” obtain restitution or aid, in the eventuality of a favorable court decision. The organization was reportedly registered in Cheyenne, Wyoming in October 2023, approximately four months before the registration of mentioned court case according to the social media account Kurdistan Watch (Kurdistan Watch, 2024).
Maki Revend is a registered plaintiff in this case. He is a dissident/political activist born in Iraqi Kurdistan and living in Germany (VOA English, 2024). Germany is reportedly home to largest Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Dag, 2022). In one of the few articles on his political activity that can be found on the internet, he reportedly stated in June 2021 that an attack resulting in the death of five Peshmerga members would have been jointly planned by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), i.e. Barzani political circle, and Turkey National Intelligence Organization (MIT) (Medyanews, 2021).
The complaint by plaintiffs in the (US) District of Columbia District Court case against KRG and Barzani family, among other defendants, includes crimes like for example “… atrocity crimes; indiscriminate violence; arson; claims for murder; attempted murder; genocide; abduction; hostage taking and kidnapping; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; collaboration with terrorist organizations; … theft, drug trafficking… defrauding the United States Government and others, financial crimes…false statements and declarations…obstruction of justice, bribery and facilitation payments…” among other accusations (The New Arab, 2024, pp. 6-7). The complaint mentions that a “transnational criminal network” that included Barzani family members perpetrated ”heinous crimes” like the murder of a “United States agent” and the “torture of a U.S. citizen” among others (The New Arab, 2024, p. 21). Counsel for plaintiffs has been ensured by law firm Tate Bywater PLC from Vienna, Virginia, US. The complaint indicates that Masrour Barzani is a resident of the US, hence a “United States Person” (The New Arab, 2024, p. 24).
The process is ongoing at the time of writing of this article.
Michael Rubin explained in a June 2024 article (Rubin, 2024) that the plaintiffs are in possession of “Pedawi Papers”, who detail financial transactions of Sarwar Pedawi, an important aide to Masrour Barzani. While mentioning that Masrour regularly “liaised” with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Rubin emphasizes on the drug trade charges against Barzani, and states: “Kurdish counterterror partnership is important, but Masrour overestimates the immunity it buys him. No single individual or family is essential; there is always someone willing to take their place. Some even turn state's evidence in order to ingratiate as downfall becomes more likely”. (Rubin, 2024). Rubin provided the example of Manuel Noriega’s (military) arrest by the US and his subsequent imprisonment in the US, briefly in France and then Panama after the successful Operation Just Cause (Cole, 1995).
In November 2022, journalist Shnyar Anwar Hassan filed a complaint against Masrour Barzani in Virginia Eastern District Court (PacerMonitor VA, 2024), reportedly for alleged “assault, battery, and defamation” (PUK Media, 2023). The cited article explains that the plaintiff alleged Barzani wrongfully accused her of infidelity in a December 2021 statement. According to the plaintiff, the accusation from Barzani hinted the plaintiff had had a relation with the journalist Zack Kopplin from The American Prospect, who had published an article related to properties owned by Barzani and his family in the US, including an $ 18 million CVS Pharmacy in Miami (PUK Media, 2023). Hence Barzani would have endangered the plaintiff through accusation of infidelity, given the conservative nature of society from Iraqi Kurdistan.
In a Memorandum dated May 24th, 2023, case judge T.S. Elis, III mentions that “This defamation case is a political sideshow…”, detailing that the term “political sideshow” is an accurate description of the case type that does not underestimate its importance (T.S. Ellis, III, 2024). The Memorandum Opinion further reads that Anwar Hassan is a self-proclaimed Kurdish political advocate and opposes the leadership of Barzani over KRG. The document also notes that the plaintiff’s husband was an elected member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021, and that the plaintiff and her husband publicly criticized the Defendant and his family (T.S. Ellis, III, 2024, p. 2). The Memorandum Opinion dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint “for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)” (T.S. Ellis, III, 2024, p. 15).
Recent developments in Iraqi Kurdistan’s geopolitical trajectory
Cengiz Gunes explains in his book “The Kurds in a New Middle East” that throughout the 1970s, Iran was supporting Kurdish insurgency in order to gain concessions from Iraq. The Shah of Iran was supporting Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s rebellion against Iraq’s Baathist government, Iran itself supported by Israel and the US. The 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran weakened Kurdish strategic position and Barzani decided to end the resistance movement and relocate initially to Iran and then to the US. The divisions related to this decision led to the founding of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Damascus on June 1st, 1975 (Gunes, 2019, pp. 25-26) under Jalal Talabani. Clashes emerged between PUK and peshmerga forces on one side, and KDP and their peshmerga forces on the other. At the beginning of Iraq-Iran war, KDP was based in Iran, who also supported it, and PUK, initially allied with Syria, signed an agreement with the Iraqi government in October 1983 with focus on autonomy and from 1986 it sided with Iran and made peace with KDP. Despite Arabization attempts and repression throughout 1980s, the Kurds managed, with the help of allies, to make breakthroughs towards autonomy, that was enacted in June 2003, in the aftermath of allied invasion of Iraq (Gunes, 2019, pp. 26-29). The autonomous “Region of Kurdistan” was recognized in the post-2003 Iraqi federal system and 2005 Constitution. Article 112 of this document provides that federal government has to work with regional governments and governorates for oil and gas extraction.
The Iraqi Kurds emerged as a potential US contextual ally in containing or removing Saddam Hussein. “Kurdish demands” were recognized in September 1998 and in 2003, the Kurds supported American efforts in Iraq (Gunes, 2019, pp. 15-16). The recognized region of Iraqi Kurdistan has reportedly become an ally of the Occident, and the US began to support Syrian Kurds as well, in 2014, according to Gunes, despite opposition from Türkiye (Gunes, 2019, p. 16).
Until recently, regional geopolitical landscape was not necessarily stable, but predictable. While the US was maintaining its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdish region, both Türkiye and the US were fighting terrorism in Syria, and Baghdad was not involved in larger regional dynamics. However, after 2017 US withdrawal from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s regional activity appeared to increase, a development that intensified clashes with the US and Israel in Syria, but also Iraq (e.g. the assassination of Qasam Soleimani). At the same time, Türkiye stepped up its fight against Kurdish separatist factions, beginning to launch independent operations in Syria and Iraq. The relations between Türkiye and Barzani leadership from Iraqi Kurdistan were generally good, but tension was also present: in 2017, President Erdogan reportedly accused Masoud Barzani of “treachery” over an independence referendum (Butler, Erkoyun, & Dolan, 2017), that was illegal according to Baghdad.
Two main regional developments have impacted geopolitical balance around Iraqi Kurdistan: a rearrangement of the trade routes due to both Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and responses to this initiative, and a rearrangement of oil and gas routes: Europe’s supply with hydrocarbon resources has shifted and new discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as new possible routes and pipelines from Central Asia to Europe, raise the stakes for Türkiye and regional producers.
In March 2023, Türkiye halted the flow of approx. 450’000 barrels of oil per day through the Iraq-Türkiye oil pipeline, due to an arbitration order in Paris that found Türkiye in breach of a 1973 treaty requiring Baghdad’s agreement for oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan. The ruling also ordered Ankara to pay $ 1.5 billion in compensation for unauthorized exports for the period 2014-2018 and a subsequent ruling is to establish the damages from 2018 onwards, while Baghdad might be liable for $ 25 million per month for halting the flows (Grover, 2024). Iraq maintains that the delays in restarting the flow of oil are caused by foreign companies, that refuse to negotiate contracts with the government from Baghdad after the ones with KRG were deemed invalid (Shaw, 2024).
The 2023 decision from International Chamber of Commerce based in Paris shifted business partners away from KRG, and implicitly Barzanis, to the federal government from Baghdad. Unrelated to previous French – KRG previous relations, in May 2023, Iraqi Major General Rasool hinted at a $ 3.2 billion deal with Dassault Aviation for 14 Rafale fighter jets, payable eventually in oil supplies (Lake, 2024). Türkiye agreed on the Development Road project with Baghdad and regional partners as of April/May 2024, in a shift from business directly with the KRG towards regional government.
Amid an apparent systematic isolation of Barzanis by traditional political partners, Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s President Nechirvan Barzani visited Iran in early May 2024 (The Presidency of the Kurdistan Region - Iraq, 2024), while Bafel Jalal Talabani was visiting Washington and meeting government officials including Department of State (DoS) and US Congress centers (PUKmedia 1, 2024). Bafel Jalal Talabani was also the only party president from Iraqi Kurdistan Region attending the Munich Security Conference in February 2024, confirming the assumption of political isolation of the Barzanis in Western circles (PUKmedia 2, 2024).
In an August 18th, 2023 article, Michael Rubin hinted that Masrour Barzani’s days as leader in Iraqi Kurdistan are numbered, mentioning that he should be worried (Rubin 2, 2023). Among the causes, he enumerates reasons like the alleged loss of influence with the Iraqi federal government due to the push for referendum despite Washington’s counteroffer to wait for two years, alleged mismanagement, greed, corruption, and a too obedient attitude towards Ankara.
The relation between Western partners and KRG may have also been hindered by the latter’s business with the Russian Federation. In 2017, as KRG was betting for the independence referendum, Rosneft was signing a $ 1 billion funding deal to for KRG’s gas pipeline (Zhdannikov, 2017). Rosneft also agreed in the same year to invest $ 400 million in five oil blocks throughout Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017 as well. According to a separate report, the Kremlin “remained silent” on the referendum as these deals were signed, Israel being the only supporter of the Kurdish independence referendum, while the Iraqi federal government, Ankara and Tehran were expressing their opposition and implementing measures (Radio Farda/Reuters, 2017). Russian investments in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region do not appear to have caused diplomatic spats between Kremlin and Baghdad: the two governments cooperate in the framework OPEC+ and Russian investment in Iraq remained in the order of billions.
Conclusion
This article presented aspects of an ongoing court trial and complaint against the Barzanis, KRG and other defendants, and a trial that was closed with a dismissal of claims against defendant Masrour Barzani in the US.
The main part of the article briefly mentions relations of neighbors and the US with Iraqi Kurdish political factions since the 1960s – 1970s, with emphasis on the changing role they played before, during and after the Iraq – Iran war. A major geopolitical shift in recent years throughout this region appears to have been triggered, among other developments, by Barzanis’ push for independence through a referendum supported only by Israel according to the media. While Türkiye and Western partners like France and the US appear to shift away from business with the Barzanis and KRG, and cooperate more with the Iraqi federal government and other Iraqi Kurdish politicians, the Barzanis appear to have turned to Iran for regional cooperation. But Iran is asking the implementation of a security agreement and a joint security committee, which might also fundamentally impact the region if implemented consequently. The Russian massive investments in Iraq appear to have been initiated in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, but the deals in Iraqi Kurdistan Region did not disrupt relations with Baghdad.
Recent geopolitical shifts related to the Barzanis and Iraqi Kurdistan Region appear to be significant. Should the Western relations with this region remain as extensive as they are today, or strengthen amid an increasing cooperation directly with the Iraqi federal government, it appears that the Barzani family is under pressure by increasing exchanges between Bafel Jalal Talabani, President of PUK, and Occidental counterparts. The emerging cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad will also impact relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and its political environment.
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